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Introduction
In many countries, the members of parliament (MPs) decide on their own salaries (e.g., Mause 2014) . Having decision-making authority over their own salaries may facilitate political benefits or political rent extraction, because increases in salaries are likely to be generous when MPs decide on their own salaries. The possibility of rent extraction provides self-serving politicians with incentives for rent creation and rent sharing (Hillman 2015) .
Voters dislike self-serving politicians and may accuse politicians of impropriety with taxpayers' money when increases in salaries appear to be too high. Because politicians are keen to gratify their voters and the media often discusses adjustments of the salaries of politicians, politicians ponder when to increase their salaries, and may, thus, delay decisions on increases in salaries until after elections. The self-induced increases of the salaries of MPs may be a prime example for electoral cycles. The political business cycle theories describe that election-motivated politicians pursue expansionary policies before elections. Election-motivated politicians may, for example, increase public spending, and especially public spending that is visible to voters, or they may decrease taxes (Nordhaus 1975, Rogoff and Sibert 1988) . Many empirical studies portray how election-motivated politicians manipulate economic policy-making. 2 In Germany, electoral cycles occur on all levels of government, and particularly on the state level: elections have been shown to influence the hiring of teachers and police officers, cultural policies, deficit spending, social security expenditure, active labor market policies, fiscal forecasts, hospital beds, firms' investments, and business perceptions (Tepe and 1 Salaries are certainly only one part of the remuneration of politicians (see Arnim 1998 and ; increases in other parts (such as pensions) are, however, less visible and, thus, may be less likely to show electoral effects. 2 On political budget cycles in the European Union, see Efthyvoulou (2012) ; on political budget cycles in a larger set of countries, see de Haan and and Klomp and de Haan (2013) . Katsimi and Sarantides (2012) , Bove et al. (in press) , Köppl-Turyna et al. (2016) , and Castro and Martins (2016) investigate how elections influence budget composition and Osterloh (2012) and Potrafke (2012a) examine how elections influence economic performance. Incumbents increased the growth in public health expenditure and were active in creative accounting before elections (Potrafke 2010 , Herwartz and Theilen 2014 , and Reischmann 2016 . Foreign reserves in democracies were higher before elections (Jäger 2016) . Transparency may mitigate political budget cycles (Benito and Bastida 2009 ). On public investment and re-election prospects, see Katsimi and Sarantides (2015) . Vanhuysse 2009 , 2013 , Schneider 2010 , Mechtel and Potrafke 2013 , Potrafke and Roesel 2016 , Riem 2016a and 2016b . On the municipal level, elections have been shown to influence total spending, local business tax rates, and public administration decisions Riedel 2014, Garmann in press ).
Evidence about electoral cycles on the federal level suggests that elections influence centralized wage negotiations in the public sector (Matschke 2003) , but not macroeconomic indicators and social policies (Berger and Woitek 1997, Potrafke 2012b ).
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How large should politicians' salaries optimally be? The literature concludes that high salaries for politicians may be justified for two reasons: high salaries for politicians may improve the performance of politicians due to an incentive effect, and it is conceivable that higher wages attract better candidates (Besley 2004 , Caselli and Morelli 2004 , Messner and Polborn 2004 , Mattozzi and Merlo 2008 , Keane and Merlo 2010 , Bordignon et al. 2013 .
Indeed, empirical studies suggest that higher wages attracted more educated candidates in
Italy (Gagliarducci and Nannicini 2013) and also increased the quality of female candidates in
Finland (Kotakorpi and Poutvaara 2011) . In the European parliament, by contrast, increased salaries yielded less experienced newly-elected politicians (Braendle 2015) . Evidence on how salaries influenced efforts in the European parliament is mixed (Fisman et al. 2013 , Mocan and Altindag 2013 , Braendle 2015 .
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In the German states, MPs decided annually on their own salaries, particularly in the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s (currently, the salaries of MPs are coupled with employees' salaries 3 In the United Kingdom, elections influenced MPs' outside activities (Geys 2013) . In the United States, bureaucrats' salaries increased more in election years (Borjas 1984) . See Vadlamannati (2015) on electoral cycles in anti-corruption policies. Political cycles may be influenced by term limits (Klein and Sakurai 2015, Dalle Nogare and and globalization (Efthyvoulou 2011) . 4 A political office may also give rise to private returns (Eggers and Hainmueller 2009 , Querubin and Snyder 2013 , Fisman et al. 2014 , Kotakorpi et al. 2015 . When politicians earn these private returns during an official political term, returns may influence parliamentary effort (Gagliarducci et al. 2010, Arnold et al. 2014, Geys and Mause in press ). See Peichl et al. (2013) on how the salaries of politicians and private sector executives differ in Germany; Elliott et al. (2005) compare the public and private sector pay in the United Kingdom. The education of voters and US governors' salaries have been shown to be negatively correlated (Mirhosseini 2016) . On the nexus between institutional restrictions and bureaucratic rents see Luechinger et al. (2014) ; on rent extraction see also Potrafke (2015 and 
Empirical analysis

Descriptive statistics
We use data on MPs' nominal salaries from state law gazettes and further data from the federal and the states' statistical offices, the state election administrators, the German Bundestag, and the German Council of Economic Experts. We use annual data over the period 1980-2014 for the West German states and over the period 1991-2014 for the East German states. In some states our data end earlier, because these states have started to index MPs' salaries (see section 2.1). We exclude Thuringia, because MPs' salaries in Thuringia are coupled with the general development of wages since 1990. We also exclude increases in salaries of over 20 percent, which represent increases after reforms in parliament such as adjusting the taxation of salaries or transforming a part-time parliament into a full-time parliament. The sample includes 15 states and 367 observations. 6 Figure 1 shows the average increase in MPs' nominal salaries after and before elections. MPs' salaries increased on average by 1.96 percent when it was the first increase within the 365 days after an election; and by 2.07 percent when it was the last increase within the 365 days before an election. At other times of the legislative period, MPs' salaries increased on average by 2.54 percent. T-tests on means indicate that post-election and preelection increases are both not significantly different from increases at other points in time.
To arrive at more precise inferences about the nexus between points of time in a legislative period and increases in salaries, the left part of Figure 2 shows the result of a nonparametric regression of increases in salaries on the share of a legislative period that has passed, using kernel-weighted local polynomial smoothing; the right part shows a semiparametric regression including all our (parametric) control variables (see Boone et al. 2014, 404-407) . Both panels corroborate the evidence from Figure 1 and suggest that MPs' salaries increased somewhat less at the beginning and at the end of a legislative period. The regular pattern of local minima arises from our coding of pay freezes (see footnote 6). Table 1 shows descriptive statistics. Table 2 
Empirical strategy
The baseline panel-data model has the following form: assumes the value one when a left-wing government was in office, the value 0.5 for a center government, and the value zero for a right-wing government (e.g., Potrafke 2013, Potrafke et al. 2016) . It is conceivable that politicians increase their salaries more when they enjoy a large majority of seats in parliament (see Benito et al. 2014 and Svaleryd and Vlachos 2009 however, is only statistically significant at the 10 percent level.
Regression results
In Table 4 Figure 2 ; the effects lack, however, statistical significance at conventional levels. The effects of Share of legislative period passed and its quadratic term lack also statistical significance when we include fixed time effects in Table 6 .
As a placebo test, we include in Table 7 also the indexed years in our sample. The sample size thus increases to 478 observations. Inferences regarding the election period dummies and the effect of the continuous time variable Share of legislative period passed do not change independent of including or excluding fixed time effects. This holds also for employees' salaries.
In Table 8 we run the regressions for the indexed years only (111 observations). The coefficients of the election period dummies and the employees' salaries lack statistical significance. The effect of the variable Share of legislative period passed and its quadratic term also lack statistical significance. The variable Government ideology is only statistically significant in one specification.
Robustness tests
We submitted our results to rigorous robustness tests using different specifications of our regressions and different samples. None of these robustness tests indicates any severe fragility in our results.
We estimated our baseline panel-data model with a fixed-effects estimator. Figure 2 . Inferences compared to our baseline model do not change when we use a random-effects model. Inferences with a random-effects Tobit model are similar to those with a Tobit cross-section estimator.
As an alternative to considering the growth rate of MPs' salaries as the dependent variable, we used a binary variable that assumes the value one when salaries were increased and zero otherwise. Running a probit or logit model, the results show that the probability of an increase in salaries was lower after and before elections. Given the results in Tables 3 and   4 , this indicates that positive increases in MPs' salaries were higher after and before elections.
In fact, if increases were positive, they were on average 4.69 percent after an election and 4.96 percent before an election, but only 4.31 percent at other times. The effect of the continuous time variable Share of legislative period passed is statistically significant when we also include its quadratic term.
We also tested if only decisions on extraordinary increases in salaries were influenced by electoral cycles. To this end, we used a binary variable as the dependent variable that assumes the value one when MPs' salaries were increased more than (lagged) employees' salaries. Running a probit or logit model, the results show that the probability of MPs' salaries increasing more than those of employees was lower before and after elections.
We tested whether inferences change when we include the lagged level of MPs' salaries to control for mean reversion. The results show that a higher lagged level of MPs' salaries decreased the growth rate of salaries when we do not include fixed time effects, but still do not show that elections influenced increases in salaries.
In constructing our main explanatory variables Post-election period and Pre-election period, we captured increases in salaries within the 365 days after or before an election.
Inferences do not change when we alternatively capture increases in salaries within 0. Our measure of employees' salaries includes net salaries, income tax, and the social security contributions of employees. Inferences regarding electoral cycles and the effect of increases in employees' salaries do not change when we use an alternative measure of employees' salaries that also includes the social security contributions of employers.
Inferences regarding electoral cycles also do not change when we replace the (lagged) growth in employees' salaries with the (lagged) growth in GDP, which is statistically significant at the 10 percent level only in some specifications. To describe the power of a government, we used the seat share of the governing parties in parliament. Inferences regarding electoral cycles and the effect of the power of a government do not change when we use the vote share of the governing parties divided by the vote share of all parties represented in parliament.
We examined whether our results are driven by individual years or individual states. 
Conclusion
In the German states, MPs decided annually on their own salaries, particularly in the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s. The German states are therefore an excellent laboratory for electoral manipulation. We investigated whether elections influence increases in MPs' salaries. The results do not show (robust) evidence for electoral cycles in decisions on increases in MPs' salaries; nor do government ideology and the power of the government influence MPs' salaries. We do find, however, that increases in MPs' salaries are positively correlated with increases in employees' salaries.
Why is it that increases in MPs' salaries do not show an electoral cycle? When MPs increase their salaries, they do so for all MPs, not only for the MPs of the governing parties.
To be sure, politicians from the governing parties may well be punished for having initiated and having voted for increases in salaries. Understanding that all politicians benefit from an increase in salaries, voters, however, may only be disenchanted with politics in general, without punishing individual parties. Politicians can then increase their salaries at any point of time without having to expect a negative voter reaction. This also explains why governments with a large majority in parliament do not increase salaries more than governments with a fragile majority. The seat share of a government is below 50 percent in the case of a minority government. 
